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Randomized control trials are sometimes used to estimate 
the aggregate benefit from some policy or program. 
To address the potential bias from selective take-up, 
the randomization is used as an instrumental variable 
for treatment status. Does this (popular) method of 
impact evaluation help reduce the bias when take-
up depends on unobserved gains from take up? Such 
“essential heterogeneity” is known to invalidate the 
instrumental variable estimator of mean causal impact, 
though one still obtains another parameter of interest, 
namely mean impact amongst those treated. However, 
if essential heterogeneity is the only problem then the 
naïve (ordinary least squares) estimator also delivers this 
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parameter; there is no gain from using randomization as 
an instrumental variable. On allowing the heterogeneity 
to also alter counterfactual outcomes, the instrumental 
variable estimator may well be more biased for mean 
impact than the naïve estimator. Examples are given for 
various stylized programs, including a training program 
that attenuates the gains from higher latent ability, an 
insurance program that compensates for losses from 
unobserved risky behavior and a microcredit scheme 
that attenuates the gains from access to other sources of 
credit. Practitioners need to think carefully about the 
likely behavioral responses to social experiments in each 
context.   
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I.  Introduction 
Any imaginable policy intervention is likely to have diverse impacts, possibly with losses 
as well as gains to those affected. Some forms of such impact heterogeneity are known to be 
ignorable when estimating the aggregate benefits, notably when the heterogeneity is orthogonal 
to the actual receipt of the intervention. However, that is not a particularly plausible form of 
heterogeneity. Naturally, people make rational choices about whether to participate in any 
offered treatment, and they almost certainly base their choices on things they know that are not 
available as data to the analyst. Take up will depend on latent gains from take up. This gives rise 
to what Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil (HUV) (2006) term ―essential heterogeneity‖—an idea 
going back to Heckman (1992).  
Under essential heterogeneity, we expect the instrumental variables (IV) estimator to be 
biased for the mean causal effect, as shown by HUV.  HUV also question whether IV will 
perform any better than OLS; they write (p.392):
2 
―If the analyst is interested in knowing the average response, the effect of the policy on the 
outcomes of [units] that adopt it or the effect of the policy if a particular [unit] adopts it, there is 
no guarantee that the IV estimator comes any closer to the desired target than the OLS estimator, 
and indeed, it may be more biased.‖ 
 
As Heckman and Vytlacil (2005, p. 671) put it: ―The cure may be worse than the disease.‖  
This paper explores this claim further in the context of a classic randomized experiment 
for which treatment is only possible for those randomly assigned the option of treatment but 
there is selective take-up. A popular estimator uses the randomized assignment as the IV for 
treatment. This is not valid for the mean causal effect, but still gives the mean impact on the 
treated, as demonstrated by Heckman and Vytlacil (2007, Section 9.2).
3 (The specific context 
determines which of these two parameters one is most interested in.) However, as section II 
shows, if the only way that the unobserved differences in returns to treatment generate bias is 
through their interaction with take up then the IV is not required to retrieve the mean impact on 
the treated in large samples; OLS delivers the same parameter. The cure is no worse, or better! 
                                                           
2   I have dropped mathematic expressions from the quote, as these will not make sense out of context. 
3   Under certain conditions the IV estimator under essential heterogeneity does give another parameter of 
potential interest, namely the ―local average treatment effect‖ (LATE) (Imbens and Angrist, 1994), given by the 
mean impact for those units induced to take up the treatment by a change in the IV. Imbens and Angrist identify 
conditions under which LATE can be identified by the standard IV estimator. Also see the discussion in HUV.   3 
 
This comes with a potential bonus for the design of experiments: one does not need to know 
outcomes for those who were assigned the opportunity for treatment but chose not to participate.    
However, the paper also argues that the standard formulation of the essential 
heterogeneity problem in terms of a latent interaction effect with treatment status is unduly 
restrictive. Section III examines the implications of allowing the latent factors creating essential 
heterogeneity to also influence counterfactual outcomes. Depending on the direction and strength 
of this extra effect, OLS may be less biased for the mean causal impact than the IV estimator—
indeed, there is even a case in which OLS is unbiased for mean impact. 
Whether the use of randomization as an IV is to be preferred for estimating mean impact 
can thus be seen to depend on the behavioral assumptions made in modeling outcomes for the 
specific program being evaluated. Section III describes stylized examples of the various cases, 
which point to important differences between types of programs in the biases to be expected 
even with a randomized assignment of the option for take up.    
II.  Biases in Standard Impact Estimators under Essential Heterogeneity 
Selective take-up is to be expected in almost any randomized experiment with human 
subjects. So we have a potential source of bias, as is well-recognized in the literature. In practice, 
the near universal fix for this problem is to use a dummy variable for the randomized assignment 
as the instrumental variable (IV) for treatment status.
4  
The assignment to treatment will naturally be correlated with receiving the treatment. But 
can it be legitimately excluded from the main regression, as also required for a valid IV? It is 
often argued that the fact of randomized assignment means that the other conditions for a valid 
IV will invariably hold, namely that the IV only affects outcomes via treatment. At first glance it 
sounds reasonable to assume that being randomly assigned to some treatment only matters to its 
outcomes if one actually receives that treatment. However, on closer inspection this assumption 
is far from reasonable. As HUV point out, plausible behavioral responses to the option for 
                                                           
4   The theoretical conditions for this to work are laid out by Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996). The IV 
estimator is identical to the method of correcting for selective compliance proposed by Bloom (1984) in which the 
intent-to-treat estimate is deflated by the proportion who take up the assigned option of treatment. This assumes no 
―crossovers‖ in that treatment is only possible for units assigned to treatment. With crossovers, one obtains instead a 
local average treatment effect (Imbens and Angrist, 1994).  4 
 
treatment invalidate the exclusion restriction. This section elaborates on this point and explores 
further its implications for impact evaluation. 
The randomized assignment is denoted Z, which takes the value 1 if a unit is assigned to 
treatment and 0 otherwise.
5 The actual treatment status is D, taking the value 1 if treated and 0 
otherwise. At least some units take up treatment, but not all ( 1 ) ( 0   D E ). Treatment is only 
possible if one is assigned to the treatment group, but take up is voluntary. The unit-specific 
impact is , which is the difference between the outcome under treatment and that when 
untreated. Since we cannot observe someone in two states of nature at the same time,   is 
unobserved. The mean impact is  and   represents the variation in impact around the mean, 
i.e.,      . The mean impact on those treated is ) 1 ( ) 1 (     D E D E    . Given that 
treatment (conditional on assignment) is a choice variable, a natural assumption is that those who 
take up the treatment tend to have higher  ’s, i.e., ) 0 ( ) 1 (    D E D E   , implying that 
0 ) 1 (   D E  , given that   has zero (unconditional) mean.  
The standard regression specification for estimating the mean impact on outcome Y is: 
) ( D D D Y                          (1) 
The heterogeneity in impact is swept into the error term, such that the coefficient on D gives the 
mean causal effect. Now consider the standard IV estimator in which the randomized assignment 














   

          (2) 
Here I use the fact that randomization implies that 0 ) , (  Z Cov  . Randomization also implies 
that 0 ) , (  Z Cov  . However, under essential heterogeneity, it does not imply that 
0 ) , (  Z D Cov   since there will be sorting on the  ’s; amongst those assigned the program, 
those who choose to take it up will tend to have higher  ’s. Thus the randomized assignment is 
not a valid IV for identifying mean impact, as was pointed out by HUV.  
                                                           
5   Here and elsewhere I use the same notation as HUV. 5 
 
But what does the IV estimator give us? We can write the bias term on the RHS of (2) as: 
   
) ( ) ( ) (
) ( ) ( ) (
) , (
) , (
Z E D E DZ E







          (3) 
Evaluating these terms further by exploiting the fact that both D and Z are binary, with D=1 
implying Z=1 (since assignment to treatment is necessary for receiving treatment), we have:
6 
    ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( D E D E D E DZ E                  (4.1) 
    ) ( ) ( D E DZ E                  (4.2) 
Substituting (4) into (3) and then (3) into (2) we have: 
Plim ) 1 ( ˆ    D E IV                  (5) 
Thus the IV estimator still gives the mean impact on the treated, but overestimates the overall 
mean impact under essential heterogeneity.
7  
However, if essential heterogeneity is the only source of bias—specifically, if 
0 ) , (   D Cov —then the ―naïve‖ OLS estimator also gives mean impact on the treated. To see 
this, note first that for the OLS estimator (in obvious notation): 
    Plim
) (





                 (6) 
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   
    (7) 
Thus OLS also converges to ) 1 (   D E   . While the presence of essential heterogeneity 
naturally biases both estimators of overall mean impact, it turns out to be exactly the same bias. 
                                                           
6   Note that ) ( ) 1 ( )) ( 1 )( 0 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( D E D E D E D DZ E D E D DZ E DZ E            given that 
0 ) 0 (   D DZ E  .   
7   This result can be found in Heckman and Vytlacil (2007, Section 9). 
8   I use the fact that  ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) (
2 D E D E D E D E       . 6 
 
Of course, the reason is different. For the IV method, the bias stems from the violation of the 
exclusion restriction, while for OLS, it stems directly from the endogeneity of treatment.   
  Notice that if essential heterogeneity is the only concern then one does not need to know 
the randomized assignment (as required by the IV estimator) to obtain a consistent estimate of 
the mean impact for those treated; the data for OLS—outcomes and treatment status—are 
sufficient. Outcomes for those treated can then be collected alongside the receipt of treatment. 
The control group need only represent those for whom treatment is not an option.  
III.   Allowing Essential Heterogeneity to Alter Counterfactual Outcomes 
The above formulation has followed the literature on essential heterogeneity in 
postulating that it only matters through the implied interaction effect between take-up and the 
gains from treatment. This is restrictive. More generally, one can allow the same latent factors 
causing variability in the gains from treatment to have bearing on counterfactual outcomes.  
To introduce this feature, let the error term in (1) now take the form: 
                           (8) 
We can identify ―pure‖ essential heterogeneity as when 0   . More generally, latent 
characteristics that enhance impact may be associated with higher ( 0   ) or lower ( 0   ) 
counterfactual outcomes. (In the special case  1     we have a constant impact amongst those 
treated.) To keep the focus on the implications of essential heterogeneity, I assume that the 
innovation error term ( ) in (8) is orthogonal to treatment ( 0 ) , (   D Cov ). One can weaken this 
assumption to conditional exogeneity, by adding controls (or a control function).   
For interpreting the econometric model in (1) and (8), it is helpful to consider a more 
explicit model of outcomes as returns to a primary individual characteristic , which is observed 
by each experimental unit but not by the analyst, and where the return to higher can be 
systematically altered by the intervention. We can write this model as:
9 
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   
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              (9) 
This is equivalent to the model in (1) and (8) where the correspondence is as follows: 
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Rational take up requires that  ) 0 ( ) 1 (    D E D E    if the gain (    ) is increasing in  
(i.e., if  0 1 b b  ),  while  ) 0 ( ) 1 (    D E D E    if  0 1 b b  . Either way,  0 ) 1 (   D E  .   
There are three possible regimes for how heterogeneity alters counterfactual outcomes: 
0   ,  0 1     and  1    . These relate to differences in the types of programs being 
evaluated, given likely behavior responses. I provide stylized examples of each regime. 
Regime 1:  0   . Consider the following training program. The source of latent 
heterogeneity is learning ability, which is unobserved by the analyst but known individually. 
People choose whether to participate in the (randomly assigned) program on the basis of their 
ability, as this determines their expected benefits. (As usual, there is some cost of participation, 
including forgone income.)  Labor market earnings are the outcomes of interest. The program 
imparts skills that are complementary to ability, so that the returns to ability are greater under 
treatment ( 0 1 b b  ). (For example, an accountancy course enhances the returns to numeracy.) 
Absent the program, higher ability yields higher income ( 0 0  b ). Thus 0   .  
 Regime 2:  0 1     . Consider instead a public insurance scheme, providing support for 
those suffering (say) ill-health or a crop failure. Participants are compensated for income losses 
stemming from some unobserved risky behavior on their part, denoted by . The program 
attracts those with high  . Expected income is the outcome variable. In the absence of the 
program, those who undertake the risky activity are assumed to have higher expected utility but 8 
 
lower expected income ( 0 0  b ). However, with the program in place, the risk-takers are largely 
compensated for any loss, leaving a net gain in expected income ( 0 1  b ).  Thus: 0 1     .  
Regime 3:  1    . A variation on the example for Regime 1 is to suppose that the 
training program provides skills that substitute for latent ability (rather than the two being 
complements). Thus the scheme dulls the benefits from higher innate ability and is more 
attractive to those with lower ability. In this case, we have  0 1 b b   and  1    . To give another 
example of Regime 3 for a different type of program, consider a microcredit scheme, which 
provides extra credit to some target group and  denotes access to credit from other sources. 
Take up is higher for those with lower ; ) 0 ( ) 1 (    D E D E   . (For example, self-targeting 
mechanisms in the scheme’s design discourage participation for those with high .) Greater 
access to credit from alternative sources increases counterfactual incomes ( 0 0  b ) as well as 
participants’ incomes ( 0 1  b ). However, the scheme attenuates the gain enjoyed by those with 
greater access to credit from alternative sources, i.e.,  0 1 b b  . So, again,  1    . And, given that 
take up is greater for those with lower  , we have 0 ) 1 (   D E  .
10  
What biases can be expected in standard estimates of the mean impact? It is readily 
verified that the IV estimator still gives the mean impact on those treated (but not the overall 
mean impact) when the essential heterogeneity matters to counterfactual outcomes. The role of 
the IV estimator is not to remove the bias stemming from the interaction effect between 
treatment and gains from treatment, but rather to remove any bias in how the same source of 












               (11) 
Similarly to the derivation above for the bias in the IV estimator, we have: 
                                                           
10   Notice that positive returns to the latent characteristic with or without treatment ( 0 0  b  and  0 1  b ) are 
consistent with both  0    and  0 ) 1 (   D E   as long as the selection yields  ) ( ) 1 (   E D E   , as is implied 
by the assumption that those with low access to credit tend to take up the scheme. 9 
 
Plim ) 1 (
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            (12) 
In Regime 1 ( 0   ), while both the OLS and IV estimators overestimate mean impact, 
the use of the randomized assignment as the IV reduces the bias in the OLS estimate.  
In Regime 2 ( 0 1     ), the outcome depends on the program participation rate. When 
the participation rate is relatively low—specifically ) 0 ( 1 ) (     D E —OLS overestimates 
mean impact, but is less biased than the IV estimator. With a sufficiently high participation rate, 
  1 ) (D E , OLS underestimates mean impact but will have a lower (higher) absolute bias than 
the IV estimate if  ) 5 . 0 ) ( ( 2  D E  is less than (greater than)    1 . A program participation rate 
less than 0.5 (common in practice) is sufficient for OLS to have lower bias than the IV estimator 
in Regime 2. OLS is unbiased when   1 ) (D E , implying that the odds of program take-up,
)) ( 1 /( ) ( D E D E  , equal the relative returns to the latent characteristic, 0 1/b b . This is clearly a 
knife-edge property. 
In Regime 3 ( 1    ), OLS underestimates the true mean impact, while IV overestimates 
it. As in Regime 2, with    1 ) (D E , the (absolute) OLS bias will be less than (greater than) the 
IV bias if   ) 5 . 0 ) ( ( 2  D E  is less than (greater than)    1 . (A necessary condition for the OLS 
estimate to be less biased is that 5 . 0 ) (  D E , but this is not sufficient.) The weighted mean of the 
two estimates will be unbiased when the weight on the OLS estimate is ) /( )) ( 1 (    D E . The 
lower the treatment rate, the higher the weight on the OLS estimate. The greater the effect of the 
impact heterogeneity on counterfactual outcomes the higher the weight on the IV estimate.   
IV.  Conclusions 
  Essential heterogeneity is such an intuitively plausible idea that the onus on analysts 
should be to establish a priori grounds why it does not exist. Short of such grounds, we can 
expect a bias in the estimate of mean causal impact obtained by using the randomized 
assignment as the instrumental variable for treatment status. The bias stems from a failure of the 
exclusion restriction, even with a perfectly randomized assignment. This much is clear from the 10 
 
theoretical literature. But will the IV estimator still help in reducing the bias in the naïve OLS 
estimator, as obtained by ignoring the endogeneity of treatment and simply subtracting the mean 
of the outcomes for the control group from that for the treatment group?  
  The answer depends on what impact parameter one is interested in, the type of program 
one is evaluating and the behavioral responses to that program. If one is only interested in the 
mean impact for those actually treated then the IV estimator is still unbiased, even though the 
randomized assignment is not a valid IV. However, if the latent interaction effect between take 
up and the gains from take up is the only source of bias then the OLS estimator also delivers the 
mean treatment effect on the treated. Under the ―pure‖ form of essential heterogeneity studied in 
the literature, the IV and OLS estimates converge asymptotically.  
The two estimators only differ in large samples when there is some other source of bias, 
on top of that from the interaction effect between the take up and the unobserved variation in the 
impact of the treatment. A natural extension to the standard formulation of the essential 
heterogeneity problem is to allow the same factors creating the heterogeneity in impact to also 
matter to counterfactual outcomes. If these work in the same direction—such that higher 
counterfactual outcomes due to the latent factor come hand-in-hand with higher returns to 
treatment—then the IV estimator can be trusted to reduce the OLS bias in mean impact. A 
training program providing complementary skills to latent ability is probably a good example.  
However, there is no a priori reason to expect the two sources of bias to work in the same 
direction. That depends on the type of program and the behavioral responses to that program. If 
the latent factors leading to higher returns to treatment are associated with lower counterfactual 
outcomes then the ―IV cure‖ for endogenous treatment can be worse than the disease. The paper 
has described examples, based on a stylized public insurance program and a microcredit scheme 
for fighting poverty. Indeed, the OLS estimator may even be unbiased, despite the selective take-
up. And even when it is not, averaging the IV and OLS estimates can reduce the bias under 
certain conditions.   
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